Trust-Aware Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Financial Risk Management

Authors

  • Pleun Moenen Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA.
  • Enzio Gori Department of Computer Science, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, USA.
  • Jasmijn van Saksen Department of Computer Science, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA.
  • Candida Gordillo Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA.

Keywords:

trust-aware reinforcement learning; multi-agent systems; financial risk management; adaptive governance; systemic risk; market regime shifts; algorithmic accountability; socio-technical infrastructure

Abstract

Financial risk management is shifting from centralized analytical pipelines toward distributed decision systems that combine machine learning, real-time market data, and autonomous or semi-autonomous agents. This paper examines trust-aware multi-agent reinforcement learning as an architectural and governance paradigm for adaptive financial risk management. The central argument is that trust cannot be treated as a secondary interface concern or as a simple confidence score. Instead, trust must be embedded as a system-level property that influences information sharing, action selection, escalation, auditability, and collective risk posture. The paper develops this argument through a system-oriented analysis of multi-agent learning architectures, market regime shifts, institutional governance, deployment infrastructure, sustainability, robustness, fairness, and policy implications. It considers how trust-aware coordination can improve resilience during stress events while also introducing new failure modes, including collusive convergence, opacity, correlated behavior, and accountability diffusion. The discussion emphasizes structural trade-offs between adaptability and stability, autonomy and control, efficiency and contestability, and local optimization and systemic prudence. It also connects financial risk management to broader socio-technical concerns such as algorithmic accountability, regulatory technology, and inclusive access to financial services. The paper concludes that trust-aware multi-agent reinforcement learning is most credible when designed as a governed infrastructure rather than as a purely predictive model. Its value depends on transparent incentives, contestable decision pathways, human oversight, stress-tested deployment, and continuous institutional learning across market cycles and regulatory regimes.

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Published

2026-08-26

How to Cite

Pleun Moenen, Enzio Gori, Jasmijn van Saksen, & Candida Gordillo. (2026). Trust-Aware Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Financial Risk Management. Global Financial Analytics Research Review, 1(1). Retrieved from https://www.gfarr.org/index.php/home/article/view/162